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Real Estate Agents, Brochures and Misleading or Deceptive Conduct? 
 
 
The decision of the High Court in Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd 
[2004] HCA 60 involves issues that affect every person who is induced to buy 
real estate in Australia by statements in sales brochures distributed by real 
estate agents.  One of these issues is the extent to which estate agents 
unwittingly engage in misleading or deceptive conduct under s 52 of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘the Act’) when they distribute sales brochures that 
contain untrue or misleading statements prepared by others.  A further issue 
is the extent to which agents can escape liability by relying on disclaimers 
about the authenticity of false statements contained in brochures prepared by 
them. 
 
The Facts 
 
The respondent, Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd, a real estate agency (‘the 
agent’), prepared and handed to Mr Jeffrey Butcher and Ms Judith Radford a 
promotional brochure concerning the sale of a residential waterfront property, 
which Mr Butcher and Ms Radford subsequently bought at auction.  The 
brochure contained a reproduction of a survey diagram of the property, which 
consisted of land held under freehold and land held under a permissive 
occupancy granted by a government department.  The survey diagram 
emanated from a survey report which the vendor of the property had provided 
to his solicitors for inclusion in a draft contract of sale. 
 
The survey diagram purported to depict a swimming pool as lying wholly 
within the freehold of the property.  In fact, the freehold boundary of the 
property (as delineated by the mean high water mark) traversed the swimming 
pool so that the swimming pool lay partly within the freehold and partly within 
the permissive occupancy.  Mr Butcher and Ms Radford (‘the purchasers’) 
claimed that: 
 
 they intended to relocate the swimming pool;  
 
 the agent was aware of this intention before the auction;  
 
 they had purchased the property relying on the survey diagram in the 
brochure; and  
 
 they would not have bought the property if they had known that the 
swimming pool did not lie entirely within the freehold. 
 
The Issue 
 
The ultimate issue in the appeal was whether, by distributing the brochure 
which did not correctly identify the boundary of the property, the conduct of 
the agent amounted to misleading or deceptive conduct or conduct that was 
likely to mislead or deceive in contravention of s 52 of the Act.  To determine 
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this issue it was also necessary to consider the operation of certain exclusion 
clauses.  The exclusion clause of relevance to the agent provided: 
 
 All information contained herein is gathered from sources we believe to be reliable.  
However we cannot guarantee it’s [sic] accuracy and interested persons should rely 
on their own inquiries. 
 
The Result 
 
By a 3-2 majority the High Court held that the agent did not engage in conduct 
that was misleading or deceptive.  The majority consisted of Gleeson CJ, 
Hayne and Heydon JJ, who delivered a joint judgment.  Separate, dissenting 
judgments were delivered by McHugh and Kirby JJ.  Each of these judgments 
will be examined in turn. 
 
The Majority Joint Judgment of Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ 
 
The majority affirmed the principles discussed in Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 
CLR 661, in relation to a party who acts as a conduit of information.  In Yorke 
v Lucas, Mason ACJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ noted (at 666) that a 
corporation could contravene s 52 even though acting honestly and 
reasonably: 
 
That does not, however, mean that a corporation which purports to do no more than pass on 
information supplied by another must nevertheless be engaging in misleading or deceptive 
conduct if the information turns out to be false. If the circumstances are such as to make it 
apparent that the corporation is not the source of the information and that it expressly or 
impliedly disclaims any belief in its truth or falsity, merely passing it on for what it is worth, we 
very much doubt that the corporation can properly be said to be itself engaging in conduct that 
is misleading or deceptive. 
 
In applying these principles, the majority considered that it was important that 
the agent’s conduct be viewed as a whole.  On this basis, the agent did not 
engage in conduct that towards the purchasers that was misleading.  The 
agent did no more than communicate what the vendor was representing, 
without adopting it or endorsing it.  This conclusion flowed from the nature of 
the parties, the character of the transaction contemplated, and the contents of 
the brochure itself. 
 
The nature of the parties 
 
The purchasers were persons who were quite wealthy, intelligent, shrewd and 
self-reliant.  On the other side was a suburban real estate agent.  In so far as 
the representation alleged was a representation about title, the majority noted 
that suburban real estate agents do not hold themselves out as possessing 
research skills or means of independently verifying title details about 
properties they seek to sell.  It was a matter of common experience that 
questions of title to land can be complex requiring specialist skills both legally 
and factually.  These specialist skills are outside what suburban real estate 
agents hold themselves out as doing and are likely to be able to do. 
 
The character of the transaction 
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The transaction was the purchase of a very expensive property ($1.36 
million), to be used as an investment.  The purchasers engaged appropriate 
professional advisers to assist them, namely an accountant, an architectural 
designer and building consultant, a licensed builder and they also engaged 
solicitors to assist with the process of making and completing the contract. 
 
The contents of the brochure 
 
The trial judge found that potential purchasers would be likely to assume that 
the survey diagram, forming part of the brochure, had been taken from an 
identification survey report.  It was plain that the diagram had not been made 
by the agent, and the circumstances negated any suggestion that the agent 
had adopted the survey diagram as its own, or that the agent had verified its 
accuracy. 
 
What was the effect of the disclaimers?  Although not noticed by the 
purchasers, the disclaimers were there to be read.  Although in small type, 
only persons of very poor eyesight would find them illegible.  The majority 
noted that a reasonable purchaser would have read the entire brochure.  
According to the majority, read as a whole, the brochure meant: 
 
The diagram records what a particular surveyor found on a survey in 1980. We are 
not surveyors. We did not do the survey. We did not engage any surveyor to do the 
survey. We believe the vendor and the surveyor are reliable, but we cannot 
guarantee the accuracy of the information they have provided. Whatever you rely on, 
you must rely on your own inquiries 
 
For this reason, the majority concluded (at [51]): 
 
Hence it would have been plain to a reasonable purchaser that the agent was not the 
source of the information which was said to be misleading. The agent did not purport 
to do anything more than pass on information supplied by another or others. It both 
expressly and implicitly disclaimed any belief in the truth or falsity of that information. 
It did no more than state a belief in the reliability of the sources. 
 
The Dissenting Judgment of McHugh J 
 
Unlike the majority, McHugh J found that the conduct of the agent was 
misleading or deceptive.  In reaching this conclusion, McHugh J placed 
considerable reliance on the fact that the brochure failed to identify the author 
of the survey diagram and, also, the agent’s conduct at a subsequent physical 
inspection of the property where everything said on behalf of the agent was 
premised on the pool being within the boundary of the freehold land: 
 
The conduct of Mr Elder at the inspection…and the conduct of Lachlan Elder in 
distributing the brochure were significant factors in inducing the purchasers to buy the 
property.  Lachlan Elder not only distributed a brochure containing an inaccurate 
survey diagram but at the inspection it did nothing to correct the misapprehension 
under which the purchasers laboured.  It is not to the point that Lachlan Elder was 
unaware that the survey diagram was inaccurate.  Section 52 looks at the conduct of 
a corporation and is concerned only with whether that conduct misled or was likely to 
mislead a consumer.  (at [139]). 
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In my opinion, the conduct that Lachlan Elder engaged in in selling the Rednal Street 
property was conduct that was likely to mislead the purchasers.  Lachlan Elder put 
out a brochure containing an incorrect survey diagram in a context that suggested 
that it had adopted the survey diagram as its own.  It knew of the purchasers' 
intention to relocate the swimming pool.  It knew that its subsequent conduct in 
continuing to "endorse" the brochure was likely to induce the purchasers to buy the 
property because they believed that they would be able to move the pool to a location 
within the freehold boundary.  Its conduct led the purchasers into error and was, 
therefore, conduct that was misleading or deceptive.  (at [140]). 
 
Having found that the conduct of the agent was misleading or deceptive, 
McHugh J did not consider that the disclaimer was effective to obliterate the 
effect of this conduct.  In reaching this conclusion, McHugh J noted the 
accepted line of Federal court authority to the effect that such disclaimer 
clauses do not have independent force of their own.  A disclaimer clause will 
only be effective if it actually modifies the impugned conduct such that the 
conduct as a whole may be seen as not misleading.  Further, the case law 
suggested that disclaimers that appear in small print at the foot of marketing 
brochures are rarely effective to prevent conduct from being found to be 
misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive. 
 
Finally, McHugh J opined that it would be contrary to the consumer protection 
objects of the statute and to public policy for disclaimers to deny a statutory 
remedy for offending conduct under the Act. 
 
The Dissenting Judgment of Kirby J 
 
Kirby J delivered a strongly-worded dissenting judgment. 
 
Kirby J considered that the circumstances revealed a clear contravention of s 
52 of the Act entitling the purchasers to succeed.  The construction of s 52, 
adopted in the majority judgment, was unduly narrow and, in Kirby J’ view, 
was not warranted by the language of the Act, the stated objects of the 
Parliament, nor by past authority.  Tiny printed disclaimers and factual 
inferences were not sufficient to deprive the purchasers of a statutory remedy: 
 
It is inappropriate for this Court to send a signal to the industry of corporate real 
estate agents, and other industries, that they can avoid the requirements of the Act by 
the simple expedient of publishing disclaimers illegible to many eyes and easily 
overlooked. It is no answer to the operation of the Act that those who suffer damage 
by "conduct that is misleading" can be expected to get their own solicitors and 
surveyors to advise them. In many cases, they can. But the Act takes effect first and 
independently of that entitlement. It imposes duties and liabilities. In this case, those 
duties and liabilities applied to the agent and were contravened. 
 
Kirby J was not convinced by the arguments that found favour with the 
majority.  
 
First, the agent was not simply passing on the vendor’s information or passing 
on information ‘for what it was worth’.  The location of the boundary line would 
be of importance to any purchaser and was known to be of special importance 
to Mr Butcher and Ms Radford.  Having chosen to include the survey diagram 
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in the brochure, and acting in accordance with the accuracy of that diagram 
subsequently, the agent was obliged to accept the legal consequences of the 
diagram being incorrect. 
 
Secondly, the personal characteristics of the purchasers were irrelevant.  The 
Act is of general application.  Protection is not denied under the Act simply 
because the applicant is an investor or shrewd and intelligent. 
 
Thirdly, Kirby J accepted that land title may give rise to complex questions of 
law and fact requiring independent specialist advice.  However, this 
consideration was extraneous to the issue of whether a corporation, dealing 
with the purchaser, had breached the anterior and separate legal obligation 
imposed by s 52.  In this instance, on the face of the brochure, there was 
nothing to suggest that it was anything but a representation of an undisputed 
fact, namely where the boundary line lay. 
 
Fourthly, it was not a proper characterisation of the agent’s brochure to 
suggest that the agent was not the source of the information or was merely 
passing the information on ‘for what it is worth’: 
 
The appearance, impression, character and object of the document deny any 
suggestion that it was someone else's document. It was the agent's production. Save 
in the one critical particular, it was a professional job, intended to perform the agent's 
function as such. For its contents, the Act required the agent, as a corporation, to 
accept responsibility for any misleading or deceptive conduct.  (at [196]). 
 
The written disclaimers 
 
Kirby J noted that the disclaimers appeared in a smaller typeface than used 
elsewhere in the brochure.  Viewed in context, the smaller typeface may have 
suggested that the information was insignificant.  This impression was 
reinforced by the positioning of the disclaimers on the brochures suggesting 
the information conveyed to be unimportant: 
 
Such a presentation of the disclaimers can be likened to the minuscule notes, 
published in obscure places in official reports, which, examined with a magnifying 
glass, typically disclose insignificant information, such as the identity of the 
government printer, the designer or some other data immaterial to the majority of 
readers. To suggest that such subscriptions constitute a communication of 
meaningful information is to defy common experience and half a century of legal 
efforts to discourage such ploys by denying them legal effectiveness.  (at [206]). 
 
In eschewing the majority’s treatment of this issue, Kirby J opined: 
 
By holding that the printed disclaimer in this pamphlet was effective to exclude liability 
under the Act, this Court, in my respectful view, strikes a blow at the Act's intended 
operation. Henceforth, in effect, the Act may not operate to protect the ordinary 
recipient of the representations of corporations engaged in trade or commerce. Many 
such corporations will be encouraged by this decision to believe that they can avoid 
the burdens of the Act by the simple expedient of tucking away in an obscure place in 
minuscule typeface a disclaimer such as now proves effective. This approach is 
contrary to the language and purpose of the Parliament.  (at [211]). 
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In determining that the written disclaimers were ineffective, Kirby J noted the 
trend of intermediate court authority which generally has set its face against 
contractual exemptions.  Kirby J also noted that this approach was considered 
justified by expert commentators on grounds of both legal principle and policy.  
In short, the finer the ‘fine print’, the more readily a conclusion will be drawn 
that the provision is not an effective exemption for lack of sufficient notice.  On 
this basis, Kirby J considered that the decision (of the majority): 
 
rewards illegible disclaimers and promises that, in the future, documents including 
them stand a real chance of avoiding the operation of the Act. With all respect, that is 
not the message that I believe this Court should give to real estate agents or any 
other corporate group. It is contrary to the purposes of the Act.  (at [215]). 
 
Comment 
 
The decision in Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd demonstrates the 
difficulties inherent in the application of s 52 of the Act where incorrect 
information is unintentionally passed on in real estate marketing material.  
While all members of the High Court accepted that a mere ‘conduit’ of 
inaccurate information may not necessarily be liable under s 52 of the Act, the 
application of the relevant principles is clearly problematic.   
 
Further, the potential operation of disclaimers in this context reveals a clearly 
‘fractured’ High Court.  On the one hand, depending on the relevant context, it 
may be suggested that failure to read and consider a disclaimer (and seek 
appropriate specialist advice, if required) may signify that the risk is to be 
borne by the consumer.  However, others seek to give primacy to legislation 
enacted to protect consumers and regulate corporate conduct.  The adoption 
of the latter approach requires that to be effective a disclaimer will need to be 
clear and emphatic so that in the word of Kirby J it will ‘reasonably…impinge 
on the consciousness of persons who thereby lose protections enacted by the 
Parliament for their benefit.’  (at [213]). 
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